Introduction
The failure of the European constitution ignited two apparently independent debates: what is the future of the European states, on one hand; and what is the place of Christian values in the European public sphere, on the other. 1 In recent years, the latter question has become more and more urgent; so much so, that the future of European secular states is considered to be very much dependent on their ability to cope with the alleged threat of religion.
Professor Sajó ' s contribution to I • CON attempts to provide both an explanation for the weakness of secularism and a response to it by laying the groundwork for a stronger concept of constitutional secularism.
2 Sajó begins his study of constitutional secularism by pointing out that strong religion is back in the public square. 3 The threat posed by religion, he argues, is real, and secularism does not provide enough guidance to keep religion at bay. The reason for this weakness is to be found in the contingent and local nature of secularism, which developed within each secular state in a way that is too much open to compromises and concessions. As a response to this state of affairs, Sajó argues that secularism should rediscover its constitutionalist roots in order to become more assertive and aggressive vis-à-vis the claims of religion.
My aim in this reply is to show that Sajó ' s diagnosis of the threat constituted by religion is only partly accurate. My suggestion is that religion is not a threat in itself but, rather, is simply a symptom of a greater malaise: the inability of secular states to cope with diversity. Moreover, Sajó ' s prognosis, entailing a stronger notion of constitutional secularism, is wrong both in theory and practice. Wrong in theory, because it assumes that European societies could agree on a common notion that excludes religion; in practice, because it believes that the best way to deal with religion is to silence it. What unites Sajó ' s diagnosis and prognosis is the belief that strong religion is a disease to be eradicated and that constitutional secularism can be the cure. I believe, instead, that the central problem to be analyzed, here, is the crisis of the secular state in its different European versions. All European states have experienced similar, though not identical, problems when regulating the place of religion in the public sphere. To cope with the crisis, the secular state should develop a twofold strategy. On the one hand, it should promote, as far as possible, active communication and mutual understanding among all the groups of a society. 4 On the other, it should accept that in some specifi c cases we face confl icts between religion and the secular state that cannot be solved by appeal to broader common principles. In these limited cases, we have to agree to disagree, and the default position, therefore, will have to promote a thinner notion of coexistence among different groups and individuals on the basis of clear rules of the game. 5 This will be illustrated toward the end of the paper with a discussion of the place of Shari'a law in European secular states.
The paper is organized in the following way: in the fi rst section, I will compare and contrast Sajó ' s diagnosis of strong religion as a threat to secular constitutional states with my diagnosis of religion as a symptom of the crisis within secular constitutional states. In the second section, I will compare and contrast Sajó ' s prognosis, consisting in ruling out religion in the public sphere, with my own position, consisting in promoting communication and mutual understanding, over the long run, and securing coexistence in cases of persistent disagreement and confl ict.
1 Two diagnoses
Religion as a threat
Sajó is principally worried about religious movements that challenge secular arrangements directly. In particular, he fears that religion may undermine " the legal arrangements that claim to be neutral and generally applicable to all people living in the national community. "
6 In a nutshell, the challenge is as follows: religion forces secular legal systems to agree on compromises and concessions that imperil the integrity and coherence of secular laws. An example would be the growing encroachment on freedom of expression for the sake of protecting religious sensibilities. As a sign of the half-hearted and meek response of secularism, Sajó adduces the continued existence of blasphemy laws that partly excuse the blurred boundary between free expression and the protection of religion. The saga of Danish cartoons teaches us, Sajó argues, that secularism is weak and open to compromises and concessions that European secular states should fi rmly and clearly refuse to make, and that they should so refuse on the basis that religion does not have a place in the public square and that we should protect what we really value. As a consequence, he welcomes the abolition of the blasphemy law on the part of the U.K. government on May 8, 2008, after a thirty-year campaign. 7 Yet, there is something lost in translation in this picture. As far as the U.K. is concerned, the abolition of the blasphemy law must be read in conjunction with the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, which deals with the balance sphere. More concretely, when devising general policies one should strive to promote communication while offering a default position in case of a breakdown. When deciding precise cases, one should evaluate the attempt to promote communication and mutual understanding. However, when disagreement is persistent and turns into a deadlock, then one should rely on the default rules of the game and accept coexistence as second best. Much of this position depends on the definition of genuine confl icts between religion and secular states. I attempt this exercise in a separate paper entitled between free speech and the right to be shielded from hatred. In section 29 J, after having defi ned what amounts to expression and behavior that stirs up religious hatred, the act states:
Nothing in this Part shall be read or given effect in a way which prohibits or restricts discussion, criticism or expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of particular religions or the beliefs or practices of their adherents, or of any other belief system or the beliefs or practices of its adherents, or proselytising or urging adherents of a different religion or belief system to cease practising their religion or belief system. The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 defi nes away the confl ict by setting what I call a presumption of priority. Free speech still sets the tone for the context in which we express ourselves. We presume that our words are free even when we want to criticize or ridicule another religion. The act, nonetheless, carves out an egregious exception, which concerns behavior and expression that intends to provoke religious hatred. How do we know what falls in the latter category? This is part of a longer story that has yet to unfold in the future years and concerns the relationship between various groups in a society. The best we can do is to avoid prefacing that relationship as a confl ict.
More generally, blasphemy is not merely a relic from the past. In Europe, it is true that free speech and secularism play a paramount role, and that there is a presumption in favor of liberty. However, courts do draw a line at a certain point; the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), for example, confronted the issue of blasphemy in its seminal case, Otto Preminger Institute v. Austria .
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The case concerned a fi lm that portrayed the Christian holy family in highly derogatory terms. The ECtHR had to decide whether the administrative sanction preventing the screening of the movie was in breach of article 10 of the convention, or whether it was justifi ed on the ground of protection of religious feelings. Strasbourg argued that the administrative sanction was justifi ed because the fi lm risked provoking a strong reaction within a prevalently Christian population.
Critics of this decision argue that there is no tension between free speech and the right not to be offended in one's own religion because the latter is not a right, properly speaking.
9 If there is a right not to be offended or harmed by other people's words, this must apply to any feeling, not only religious ones. We can be offended as football supporters, political partisans, and so on. There is nothing special about religion that warrants an ad hoc protection. This may be true on political grounds. It is arguably hard to single out an independent political reason for religion's special protection. After all, other forms of association could claim equal protection. In other words, it is diffi cult to show why, July 2009 Vol. 7: 494 as a matter of principle, religion should receive different treatment. However, it is not so diffi cult on prudential grounds. Religion can inspire large crowds by stimulating their deepest feelings of attachment and identity. Religious people are particularly susceptible to offense and are very keen on responding to the perceived harm with any means, be they legal or illegal. We learn, quickly, that part of the problem lies with the notion of secularism itself. Sajó bemoans the fact that we lack a strong normative theory of secularism to underpin our legal systems, and he attempts to fi ll this gap by offering his own brand of constitutional secularism. He begins this endeavor with an anatomy of secularism and secularization. Secularism is defi ned by Sajó as a social fact and as a feature of constitutionalism. We also learn that it stands for an ambiguous social reality, and that it is uncertain as a legal concept. Sajó then defi nes secularization as " a historical project still in the making. " In essence, for Sajó, it is about religion and its organizations " ceding some of their power over various aspects of life in favor of the state. "
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To defi ne secularization as a historical project is problematic. Yet, as Olivier Roy rightly points out, secularization is " a social phenomenon that requires no political implementation. "
11 It takes place gradually as religion loses its position at the center of human lives. Understood this way, secularization is not about the power relation between state and church but about the gradual waning of religion in society. The advantage of this defi nition is that it explains the difference between secularization, as a process, and the notion of secularism, which is a political project with a set of normative claims as to the relationship between religion and the state. Secularism and secularization may go hand in hand, as was the case in Europe until the end of last century. The resurgence of religion, however, raises doubts as to the direction of the political project, on one hand, and of the social process, on the other.
One illustration of secularism in its strongest and most aggressive form is the French notion of laïcité . This is characterized by two separate elements: legal laïcité and ideological laïcité . The former consists of " a very strict separation of church and state, against the backdrop of a political confl ict between the state and the Catholic Church that resulted in a law regulating very strictly the presence of religion in the public sphere (1905) . "
12 The latter " claims to provide a value system common to all citizens by expelling religion into the private sphere. "
13 Sajó suggests that a preferable version of constitutional secularism would be an aggressive type (close to laïcité ) capable of responding to religion and its presence in the public sphere. But in Europe laïcité is clearly an exception. No other state has an equally strong commitment to both the legal and ideological elements. No other state has entrenched a secularist principle, constitutionally, except Turkey.
14 In northern Europe, secularism is not present as a legal or constitutional doctrine (in fact, many states have an established church, as in the U.K. or Denmark). But these societies were gradually secularized, without open confrontation with religious institutions.
An additional problem for a comparative constitutional theory of secularism is that it can hardly account for experiences outside of the Western world. The notion of secularism is deeply intertwined with local practices and histories in the West, as Charles Taylor has powerfully demonstrated. 15 As a consequence, it scarcely makes sense to speak of Indian secularism as something comparable to Western experience. In addition, to propound a truly general theory of constitutional secularism becomes an uphill struggle. Sajó, no doubt, is aware of the importance of local history and other contingencies in the formation of the Western understanding of secularism. In fact, he explains the weaknesses of secularism in terms of its many different facets, which makes it a " fuzzy constitutional concept. " But for Sajó this does not constitute an obstacle for the defi nition of a concept of constitutional secularism.
If secularism is weak and uncertain because of its local rootedness, secularization is only a half-hearted compromise, according to Sajó. In the majority of legal and political systems the project of secularization has never been coherently conceived and brought forward. The relationship between church and state has been dealt with, typically, through numerous compromises and concessions thought to be compatible with secularism itself. Unfortunately, Sajó argues, the project of secularization does not lead us anywhere, given that it fails to display the intellectual consistency required to achieve any project for freeing the public square from religion. The problem with this position, as already pointed out, is that secularization is not an intellectual project but an organic development of a society in response to the gradual waning of religion in the lives of people. Secularization does not set standards according to which the public square can be considered a neutral space. Rather, it mirrors a gradual development; thus, by defi nition, it will always be a less-than-fully-realized process. Moreover, local contingencies, to great extent, shape national policies concerning religion.
Indeed, European secular states respond very differently to the alleged threat of religion. Some believe in top-down strategies, where secularism is imposed as a necessary medicine. So, for example, France was quick to enact a statute on the ban of Islamic scarves from public institutions. Others have a more laissez-faire approach. They believe that we should leave ample room for maneuver by individuals and communities. Bright-line rules in this area look suspicious and limit freedom in a perilous way. Thus the U.K., Denmark, Holland, and the Scandinavian countries are reluctant to tighten the screws on expressions of religious fundamentalism. Sajó is disappointed with the latter responses more than with the former. He advocates a stronger, more aggressive, more self-confi dent form of secularism.
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Recent events seem to confi rm his worries. In the U.K., the issue of the veil was brought out in public by then -foreign affairs minister Jack Straw (in 2006), while in Denmark the cartoons of Mohammed created much unrest in the population, and the state had to take this into account. In Holland, the murder of Theo Van Gogh made the Dutch people question their own liberal attitudes toward religion. Does this mean that the right response to religion is a more aggressive attitude on the part of the secular state? This is hardly the case. France has not responded to the threat posed by social instability in the suburbs. More generally, France is still struggling with its social problems. The country seems incapable of assimilating a large majority of its immigrants despite its aggressive integration policies. Laïcité was strong when its legal and ideological elements worked in unison. If the state and the society agree that religion is to be kept out of the public sphere, then laïcité works fairly smoothly and effectively. But that is not the case anymore, when legal laïcité imposed by the state is not immediately accepted by the whole of society. The fact of imposing on all a single precise view of the world only exacerbates the divide among the different elements of society.
European secular states are incapable of responding effectively to the increasing claims of religion. Sajó ' s diagnosis consists in singling out strong religion as a discrete threat that needs to be tackled head-on. I want to suggest that there is something wrong with Sajó ' s diagnosis. The actual problem is not religion but the secular state's inability to cope with diversity. The secular state is unable to foster mutual understanding and create an appropriate framework of coexistence for the whole society under conditions of pluralism.
Religion's revival is not a disease but simply a symptom of the crisis confronting the secular state. Religion understands that the next challenge is not at the level of the state but at another level. Supranational pressures increasingly reveal that the state is no longer the best form of organization for our societies. The struggle for the soul of Europe has moved from the level of the state to the European level. Hence the heated debate provoked by the reference to Christian values in the European constitution. As Olivier Roy rightly points out: " Religion today is participating, in the same way as the construction of Europe is, in the disassembly of the spaces that created the modern nationstate. "
17 Perhaps the European patient suffers from a deeper disease than religion. It would not be enough to eradicate that putative cancer when the whole of the European body politic is ill. Thus, one is then compelled to ask, What is the nature of this crisis?
Religion as a symptom of the crisis of the secular state
The secular state is in a diffi cult position. It barely copes with diversity and the fact of pluralism. And yet there is no alternative. Economically, this state is dependent on immigration. Politically, it can hardly create barriers and walls of separation between the West and the rest of the world. Socially, the state is unable to keep together its own population, which is increasingly atomized. It does not come as a surprise that religion is not welcome; yet, it keeps knocking at the door with increasingly more diffi cult demands. And the impossibility of satisfying them only increases the gap between different segments of society, which is thus more and more polarized. This is, in a nutshell, what can be called the crisis of the secular state.
European secular states vary considerably when it comes to the management of diversity. France fi rmly believes in the assimilation of everyone under the umbrella of republican values.
18 Unfortunately, believing is one thing; succeeding, another. Assimilationist strategies want to minimize cultural difference in order to maximize social unity at the state level. Article 1 of the French Constitution 1958 is crystal-clear: " France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs. It shall be organized on a decentralized basis. " The unity of the nation, its indivisibility, is the paramount principle of the Constitution. In order to guarantee unity, the republic proclaims itself blind with regard to religion. The second principle, tellingly, is that of laïcité (translated, problematically, as " secular " or " secularity " ). As a consequence, the law is also blind when it comes to differences of origin, race, or religion. One may think that all of this is desirable, that we can only be truly free and equal if everyone is treated as a free and equal person by the neutral state. However, to turn a blind eye to the reality of difference is deeply problematic.
If the state, as an abstract entity, can pretend to be neutral, it does not go without saying that the people constituting the state and the society will behave in like manner. Discrimination in all spheres is widespread in France. One example, above all, is the failure of the dream of " les cités " -the building blocks erected in the suburbs of cities all around France. Initially conceived as a place where everyone would become French and thank the generous state for the opportunity provided, they slowly became ghettos, where the lowliest people in the society are gathered. The crisis of the assimilationist state begins here in the banlieues . Here, religion has its strongest pull. Thus fundamentalism grows in places where the secular state wanted to erase diversity and propagate republican July 2009 Vol. 7: 494 values. By involuntarily creating these new communities in the banlieues , the French state shreds its " Rousseauist myth of a republic where there is nothing between the state and the citizen-individual in his isolation. "
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At the opposite end of the spectrum lie multicultural strategies. Diversity matters in this case. Cultural communities are allowed to form and fl ourish. The state does not impose a single model or a set of republican values. It protects a general freedom to live according to one's own cultural and social norms so long as nobody abuses his or her freedom or interferes with someone else's lifestyle. Recent events, however, have challenged this model, probably even more than they have the French model. Multicultural states such as the United Kingdom, Denmark, and the Netherlands have witnessed events that have made them ponder their own commitment to cultural diversity. After the terrorist attacks in London perpetrated by British Muslims, the reaction was clear and painful. The prime minister is reduced to insisting on British values, as if to kindle the French Rousseauist myth, hoping to instill them in all of society.
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The fact of pluralism is beyond dispute. Yet, it is a double-edged sword; it has advantages but also drawbacks. Western societies have become less parochial and have opened up to an ever-greater range of cultures and experiences. Within this framework, each individual is capable of choosing the life that best suits his values. But communication among the various groups and individuals is not always easy to achieve. The starting premises are, more often than not, different and the risk of talking at cross-purposes is high. Can we really agree on what dignity entails if one person believes it is an eminently religious notion and another believes that it is at the foundation of secular morality? For the former, God is the ultimate source of good. For the latter, God is absent from the picture, and all that matters is the self-determination of the individual. The greatest risk is polarization with a breakdown in communications. 21 It is important to stress, however, that polarization is not a consequence of the rise of religion. Of course, religion contributes to it; in fact, it thrives in this environment as it exploits division and disagreement. But religion is not the cause of polarization. The real cause is to be found in the inability of the secular state to cope with the fact of pluralism, or, to put it differently, with diversity. The unity and cohesion of our Western societies is not threatened by external agents; it is threatened, principally, from within. It is not a clash of civilizations, it is a clash within. A clash within is characterized by an oscillation between passivity and aggression. Sajó defends the swing of the pendulum toward a more aggressive assertion of our values vis-à-vis religion. He believes that secularism, as we presently understand it, is fraught with uncertainty and shabby compromises; he seeks, instead, a more aggressive and self-confi dent constitutional secularism that will be up to the job of coping with (strong) religion, which is undermining the unity and cohesion of our polities. Sajó ' s position is explicable in the present context, as we move from an essentially tolerant state to an exclusive one. In part, he acknowledges the weaknesses of the secular state but then wants to remedy these by appealing to a common notion of constitutional secularism the task of which would be primarily to police the area of reasonable positions and exclude those that do not meet these standards of reasonableness. However, the problem is that the less-than-reasonable positions thrive because the secular state has failed to integrate them in the fi rst place. So our failure to include people becomes a ground for excluding them.
Part of the problem is that from the outset we never acknowledged the fragmentation of our values. We still believe that we live in fairly harmonious societies, in principle at least, and we point to our constitutions when we need support for this claim. Lacking a cohesive society, we agree that our fall-back position, what unite us after all, is our constitutional order. After all, we can still display constitutional patriotism. Sajó stretches this image to bear on the question of the place of religion in the public sphere. He believes that behind our local and historical differences in religious matters, we do share a common constitutional commitment to secularism.
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Confl icts of values, and of worldviews, have shaped all our societies since their inception. We oscillate between the proliferation of confl icts and their adjudication. When they become unmanageable, we resort to an external adjudicator that interrupts the confl ict by the use of force. Sajó calls it a conversation stopper, after Richard Rorty. 24 If we need to resort to that, however, we have already accepted the decadence of our society and of our secular state. A good sign of a healthy polity is to be able to cope with disagreement without falling into pieces. Sajó proposes to exclude religion, the agent provocateur, so that we can put our pieces back together. By suggesting that, he misses the target. The European patient needs a different medicine.
What can secular law achieve under these circumstances? It all depends. If we were to follow Sajó ' s diagnosis, then secular law can do very little. It may raise its voice and impose bright-line rules on how to use religious arguments in public. However, it does not seem able to cope with pluralism and diversity in the matter of values. We will see, in the next section, that the prognosis 23 More on this in the second section of this article. offered by Sajó is all about eradicating the threat of religion. But this will not solve the larger problem plaguing the secular state: its inability to accept responsibility for the failure to manage diversity. If one accepts this diagnosis, religion may be regarded more as a symptom than as an illness. It is a symptom that we have to tackle and to which we must respond. However, the strategy cannot be local and aimed solely at the eradication of that symptom. The stakes are much higher; they are about reasserting the conditions for cohabitation, on one hand, and communication, on the other.
Two prognoses
The response to religion will be based, inevitably, on an evaluation of the threat that it represents. Sajó ' s diagnosis insists that religion is the major problem, one we have to tackle head on. His prognosis involves a surgical operation to remove religion from our public spaces. The intervention would take place at two levels, involving a more self-assertive notion of secular reason as the sole expression of legitimate authority and a reaffi rmation of popular sovereignty as the sole source of legitimate authority. This double medicine, Sajó argues, is mandated by constitutional secularism. An alternative prognosis follows from an acknowledgement of the crisis of the secular state in Europe. Religion cannot be regarded as the sole culprit for social tensions and unrest. The problem is much deeper and more complicated, and it needs to be addressed with a holistic and innovative attitude that should be fully capable of embracing the facts of pluralism and diversity. This prognosis can only work on a long-term basis. It is not an intrusive operation going to the core of our society to eradicate evil; it is a cognitive process that requires everyone's participation. One problem remains, and it concerns a strategy adopted to the present cases. Confl icts between the secular state and religion are real and cannot simply be dismissed. At times, it will be possible to reach a sound compromise. On other occasions, we will have to agree to disagree and resort to a default position that aims at coexistence on the basis of clear rules of the game. In what follows, I will sketch and compare these two strategies.
Constitutional secularism as a direct response to religion
Sajó ' s notion of constitutional secularism could also be called strong secularism. Its central concern is to exclude religion from the political realm. To achieve this objective, it is prepared to use strong remedies and to draw bright lines, where religion asks for compromise or concessions. Before studying what constitutional secularism requires, we need to know what constitutional secularism means.
After complaining about the weaknesses and ambiguities of secularism resulting from its uncertainty, Sajó takes us by surprise when he suggests that it is possible to identify a common core to the concept. This is all the more surprising, as Sajó repeatedly acknowledges that secularism " has no clear standing among constitutional values . " 25 This means two things: on the one hand, secularism does not fi gure as a constitutional norm but for one very limited exception. On the other, it does not correspond to any other values of constitutional status. Despite all this, Sajó still fi rmly claims that " certain fundamental demands of constitutionalism propose and demand secularism. "
26 Now, this may well be true from a purely normative viewpoint. But it does not tell us anything about the way in which different constitutional practices converge toward that common core.
The theoretical path proposed for reaching a defi nition of the concept of constitutional secularism is as follows: the starting point is represented by the many different local conceptions of secularism, which do not seem to share that much. The end point is the concept of constitutional secularism as " there seems to be enough commonality among these [conceptions] to allow us to construe the shared principles that form secularism. "
27 It is very hard to understand how Sajó comes to this conclusion since, in the fi rst part of the article, he has stressed the importance of local contingencies and histories. It is unclear, therefore, whether the concept of constitutional secularism is a top-down, purely normative concept, which comes from Sajó ' s own peculiar understanding of constitutionalism and its fundamental requirements; or whether it is a bottom-up, experience-based concept, which derives from the distillation of discrete local constitutional attempts to regulate the relationship between law and religion. It would be possible to speculate endlessly on this ambiguous starting position. It is better, however, to move on and ask what animates Sajó ' s position and what its central question is.
The central issue for Sajó is political. This seems to be a more promising context in which to analyze the problem. A more precise question could be the following: What is the place of religion in the public sphere? Of course, there is little agreement on how to defi ne the public sphere.
28 Nonetheless, many people in Europe would agree, at least, on this initial question because of our histories and practices. The question, as pointed out, is political. It is not theological or philosophical, that is, it is not about testing the theological or philosophical assumptions behind one position or another. It is about us, deciding what kind of polity we want and, with it, what kind of law and what kind of institutions. Sajó is right to point out that this is the central question. He is wrong, however, when he claims that the answer should be biased in favor of secular positions, as this is already the case. In Europe, we know already that a statute or a judicial decision cannot be prefaced or justifi ed on any religious ground. But 25 Sajó, supra note 2, at 621 (emphasis in original). crucially, the fact that the offi cial public sphere is religion-free does not and cannot imply that religion should stay out of any public space. It is because Europe is already biased in favor of secularism that we have to be particularly careful when we strike the balance between secular law and religion.
Constitutional secularism, however, strikes the balance in the harshest way: religion should stay out of the public sphere and, in particular, out of politics. Sajó suggests that we should reassert political authority as religion-free. Without secularism there is no constitutionalism, Sajó tells us. This position presents three problems. First, it seems to universalize a local understanding. Constitutional secularism, with its strong legal and ideological components, reminds us of the French version of laïcité . However, as I argued previously, French laïcité is a very peculiar exception in Europe, and there are no reasons why other European states would be better off with it. Second, it does not provide a solution for the tension between constitutional abstract principles and local, contingent understandings of secularism. Sajó merely asserts that there are enough commonalities to construe a concept of constitutional secularism. Yet there is neither evidence nor argument to this effect. If anything, Sajó convincingly persuades us that local contingencies and histories are extremely important to the understanding of secularism. Thirdly, it presents a chicken-and-egg problem: Does constitutionalism mandate secularism or vice versa? Sajó suggests, at one point, that constitutionalism mandates secularism, 29 only to assert, later on, that secularism is a precondition for the existence of a constitutional order. 30 Is there, then, a concept of constitutional secularism? The answer so far seems to be negative. But let us assume that constitutional secularism represents a common European position. What would that require the secular state to do?
Two main requirements characterize Sajó ' s constitutional secularism. First, it mandates secular reasoning to the total exclusion of religious arguments as the only form of expression; second, it asserts popular sovereignty to the total exclusion of any other source of power, in particular divine. Let us examine these in turn.
Secular reason, Sajó tells us, springs from the Enlightenment. It requires that a polity be based on reasons open to all. Since religious reasons are not accessible to nonreligious people, this would constitute a burden for them and communication would be impossible. As a result, Sajó tells us, we should exclude categorically religious reason from the public sphere. Moreover, secular reason rules out religion from legislation and other offi cial pronouncements. Secular reason is also central to the comprehension of human rights as these refer to a " homocentric world and to ways of thought freed from transcendentalist premises … . " 31 29 See Sajó, supra note 2, at 620 ( " secularism as a dictate of constitutionalism " ). 30 See id. at 626 ( " Secularism mandates a constitutional arrangement where autonomous critical reasons are to be respected as foundational for communal coexistence and self-regulation " ).
There are several problems with Sajó ' s understanding of secular public reason. First of all, he fails to draw an important distinction between secular reason and public reason, which is clearly drawn, at least by John Rawls, in " the idea of public reason revisited. " 32 Secular reason is based on comprehensive nonreligious views. Secular reason and secular values are much broader than public reason. Public reason is based on political conceptions that meet Rawls's carefully crafted conditions: " their principles apply to basic political institutions; they can be presented independently from comprehensive doctrines of any kind; they can be worked out from fundamental ideas seen as implicit in the public political culture of a constitutional regime … . "
33 Even if Rawls's distinction is not accepted by everyone, Sajó does not seem to disagree: " Secularismand not only because of its intimate relation with the Enlightenment -mandates a constitutional arrangement where autonomous critical reasons are to be respected as foundational for communal coexistence and self-regulation. "
34 He genuinely believes that secular public reason is our common comprehensive doctrine at the foundation of Western political systems.
The trouble is that secular reason, as a comprehensive doctrine, is not shared by everyone in our societies, as there are other competing comprehensive doctrines, mainly religious ones. How does one fi nd a compromise between religious and nonreligious comprehensive views without appealing to secular reason? That is the question that preoccupies Rawls, though it does not seem to preoccupy Sajó in the least. This explains why Sajó does not hesitate to call religious arguments a burden on secular people. But the problem is that our societies impose secular burdens on religious people without paying the slightest attention to religious arguments. Hence, Sajó ' s suggestion to exclude religious arguments totally has an authoritarian ring.
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If it is true that offi cial legislation and case law should not display religious arguments, this clearly does not apply to all the arguments in the public sphere. Habermas successfully distinguishes between different layers of the public sphere. The most general distinction is that between an offi cial and a nonofficial public sphere. In the latter, the presence of religious arguments should be accepted. In due time, religious arguments should be translated or supported by nonreligious reasons so that other people may also benefi t from them. These two provisos have been advanced by Habermas and Rawls, respectively. They both acknowledge, however, that this does create an asymmetry between religious and nonreligious people. Habermas, therefore, adds that nonreligious people should be required to confront arguments originating from religious views with a more open mind and a greater willingness to learn from them.
Ultimately, Sajó ' s suggestion that secular public reason is the only ground for human rights is deeply controversial. In Western democracies, there is no agreement on the issue of the foundation of human rights. Many scholars, however, recognize that human rights do have much in common with our Christian roots, even if they depart from them. 36 For all these reasons, Sajó ' s notion of secular public reason is highly problematic.
Let us now examine the second requirement of constitutional secularism: popular sovereignty as a source of power to the exclusion of religion. Sajó argues that " popular sovereignty means that all power in the state originates from people, therefore it cannot originate from the sacred . "
37 The connection between secularism and popular sovereignty is not a common feature of European states and certainly not universal. In the U.K., for example the idea that sovereignty is deeply linked to secularism is simply not true: the queen is also the head of the Church of England.
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More importantly, the argument from popular sovereignty hardly resists criticism. What if the people themselves were to seek a greater role for religion in the public sphere? Of course, they would not be able to alienate their own sovereignty, but they certainly would be able to appoint more religion-friendly offi cials. The story of Turkey, where secularism in a strong form has been constitutionalized since the times of Ataturk, is paradigmatic in this context. The confl ict between religion and the secular state is at its peak when it involves political parties. The role of religion in politics is often ambiguous. Christian parties are a traditional feature of European political systems. But what would be the legal status of Islamic parties? Are they all to be banned because they promote Shari'a law and Islamic values? Or should we distinguish between moderate and authoritarian parties? It would seem logical to allow for the representation of Muslim Europeans through political parties provided they respect the basic conditions of our political orders: democracy, fundamental rights, and rule of law. Against this background, it is somehow perplexing to observe a string of cases coming from Turkey and dealing with the dissolution of Islamic parties. The leading case is Refah Partisi .
39 However, the currently ruling party was also under scrutiny of the Constitutional Court.
In conclusion, Sajó ' s prognosis is problematic for several reasons. The concept of constitutional secularism has shaky theoretical foundations and cannot represent a truly common European position. Moreover, its requirements, namely secular reason and popular sovereignty, yield very controversial positions that do not take seriously religious people. In the following, I will suggest that a better prognosis follows from an altogether different diagnosis. Religion is not the prime problem of the secular state. The secular state itself is in search of a better foundation. Religion is there to remind the state that it constantly needs to articulate its normative premises. From this viewpoint, religion may even help the state in its endeavor of becoming stronger vis-à-vis growing numbers of confl icts between various constitutive parts of the society.
The secular state and diversity
To suggest that religion is the problem, and its exclusion from the public sphere the solution is misleading, indeed wishful thinking. Misleading, because it misses the real problem, that is, the crisis of the secular state. Wishful thinking, because it promises to resolve a major social problem of communication between groups simply by imposing a conversation stopper. 40 The secular state is unable to cope with the fact of pluralism. Rawls's agonizing question captures well the mood: " How is it possible -or is it -for those of faith, as well as the nonreligious (secular), to endorse a constitutional regime even when their comprehensive doctrines may not prosper under it, and indeed may decline? " 41 Secular and religious views can scarcely coexist without clashing with one another. Sajó suggests that the game should be won by the secular side. However, it is diffi cult to see how this squares with his claim that constitutional secularism is more than freedom from religion. It is also necessary for the maximization of freedom of religion. Even if this appears at fi rst as an attempt to present constitutional secularism as an all-encompassing doctrine, it is clear that so many different goals are not jointly achievable. Here lies the weakness of constitutional secularism and of any other comprehensive view that attempts to reconcile many different and competing interests. The most egregious ones are protected by fundamental rights. Their confl icts illustrate the problem.
Freedom of religion clashes with freedom from religion, the Islamic scarf being a possible illustration. Freedom of expression clashes with the right not to be offended in one's own religious feelings: think of the Danish cartoons. Freedom of association for political parties based on religious views clashes with secular constitutional requirements; this is what happened in several Turkish cases involving the Refah Partisi and then the Justice and Development party (AKP). And so on. Some of these confl icts can be defi ned away or avoided.
Many strategies are available and do produce local results. But is a common strategy possible?
Many still believe in the possibility of reaching an area of consensus, where we free ourselves from our ideological assumptions and exchange arguments on a level playing fi eld. Rawls's attempt to carve out a space for reasonable political views fi lls that bill precisely. Yet it is unclear whether he succeeds. And more importantly, the stakes of this game are unclear. Political liberalism aims at a political level playing fi eld. But religion in Europe may be interested in something more than the political game. It does not really want to conquer political institutions because it understands the crisis of the national state and contributes to it by pushing the boundaries and by playing with the state's many contradictions and potential confl icts. However, religion is very much interested in the social game. It wants to conquer the people. It thrives in local communities and aspires to create global ones. An example is the idea of the Umma as a global community of believers. Another example is the pope's suggestion that Christian values should be at the core of the European civil society.
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Religion may even leave to the state the political arena of institutional exchange and offi cial communication. In this domain, reasonableness applies all the way through and excludes, in principle, comprehensive views that cannot be shared by all. Religion, however, does not give up its pursuit of truth and the relevance of its comprehensive doctrine for humanity. So it claims a place, and already plays a role, in the unoffi cial public sphere. It promulgates its message on a global level, not at the state level. The real problem is, simply, that the secular state, at the national level, is struggling with the fact of pluralism and does not appear able to provide viable answers. Inevitably it resorts to the next level, the European level. At the judicial level, the ECtHR has already been solicited in growing ways by the claims of religious minorities. The response has not always been satisfactory. The court started well with the Kokkinakis case, where the ban on religious proselytism in Greece was limited on the ground of respect for religious freedom: one religion cannot hold and control a monopoly on the sacred. But lately, strict secular arrangements prohibiting the political association of moderate religious people in Turkey were upheld, at least in the Refah Partisi case.
The goal of constitutional doctrines should be modifi ed. They all aim at consensus and struggle to impose a model that would create the conditions for reaching it either procedurally or substantively. The more we insist on building consensus and convergence, the more we end up with shabby compromises, at best, and with alienated minorities, at worst. Our societies have too many overlapping and competing interests to defend. We have to accept that diversity and dissent are the underlying themes of our societies. The goal should not be to promote consensus at all costs. The goal should be dual and complex. Consensus should be sought as far as possible, on one hand. But, on the other, diversity should also be promoted and dissent allowed as much as possible. In other words, Europe should accept the possibility of confl ict as a way of life, as its central tenet, and as its engine for change.
It will not be easy to agree on fundamental values. Comprehensive views will not give up their exclusive claims to truth. It is also very hard to agree on a few selected values applying to the political realm from the viewpoint of reasonableness. However, it may be possible to agree on the rules of the game. The game is diversity and dissent, and the rules must be such that diversity and dissent do not produce violence and social strife. We already have those rules in the form of bills of rights and the case law they produced. These rules are broad enough, and yet specifi c enough, to include everyone without requesting agreement on background values.
Sometimes it will be possible to reconcile competing claims. At other times, we will have to acknowledge that certain confl icts of rights not only stand for disagreement on basic values but also for the existence of a deadlock -a situation in which we cannot reach a solution without compromising something of value. 43 In these cases, we face a dilemma. How should the rules of the game deal with dilemmas? There is no fi xed answer to that. Some legal systems will opt for legislative solutions; others for judicial ones. Yet others for a mix of the two, or for something completely different, say, direct democracy through referendum.
The way in which dilemmas are adjudicated, however, is only a contingent issue. What is more important is to acknowledge and accept the existence of dilemmas in the areas of confl ict between religion and the secular state. To do so, we will have to know more about religious claims and their background culture. In other words, we will initiate a process of mutual understanding. This would be a cognitive process that both could improve us while maintaining an underlying diversity. Only after that process, will one be in a better position to single out or defi ne more precisely the normative confl ict between religion and the secular state. Nor will it always be possible to explain away the confl ict. In these cases, one will have to agree to disagree and appeal to the rules of the legal political system to settle the confl ict. An example will illustrate this process: What should be the place of Shari'a law in Europe? The Shari'a is on everyone's lips but nobody knows anything about the subject. An increased knowledge of Shari'a would not dispel any possible confl ict, but, at least, it would diminish considerably the irrational fears that it triggers.
Ordinary courts are facing a growing number of cases in which the rules of two different legal systems clash. Strictly speaking, these are clear examples of July 2009 Vol. 7: 494 legal confl icts; they involve two valid rules that prescribe incompatible behaviors; and we have to choose between the two, thereby putting one rule to the side. For example, the rules in confl ict may concern family law and have religious roots: Can we recognize polygamy? What is the legal status of talaq divorce?
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In principle, European legal systems strictly prohibit polygamy. So if a second marriage takes place in Europe, it is customarily annulled. But what if the marriage has already taken place in another country, where polygamy is allowed? In this case the confl ict of rules is the following:
Rule 1 says polygamy is strictly prohibited.
Rule 2 says it is not the case that polygamy is prohibited.
When courts deal with problems of private international law, rule 2 is a potential candidate for incorporation into the legal system of the litigation for the purpose of adjudicating the present case. The judge will have to apply the rules of confl ict to establish which rule applies. In France, for example, the judge recognized that a polygamous relationship could yield some legal consequences such as the payment of children's benefi ts.
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Talaq divorce is another feature of Shari'a. 46 When the husband says the word talaq three times, the marriage is deemed dissolved. As a matter of principle, talaq divorce is considered against the law in most European countries. However, some courts recognize its validity if talaq divorce takes place abroad and both parties can be present to confi rm this fact before a judge. Once again the confl ict between two rules is quite explicit in theory. In practice, there is some accommodation, which becomes more and more necessary as our societies welcome a growing number of immigrants.
To a certain extent, it is possible to hold that Shari'a already has been taken into account in European legal systems. This is clearly the case when two parties opt for arbitration instead of an ordinary procedure. Private parties can perfectly well agree on settling their case before a Jewish tribunal, for example. 47 In the case of arbitration, there is no confl ict between rules; the parties simply agree to abide by a different set of rules. If the arbitrator does not produce a decision that satisfi es both parties, then ordinary courts can step in and decide the case on the basis of national law. The national courts might very well take into account religious law if it does not confl ict with the law of the land.
The entire debate triggered by the archbishop of Canterbury, therefore, starts from a misunderstanding. Critics thought that the archbishop was advocating an express integration of Shari'a law into English law. The archbishop was merely suggesting that Shari'a already plays a role in English law, and it may even play a greater role in the future. He suggested that Islamic councils could perform a function similar to that of the Jewish courts, and on the same basis. This was confi rmed, very recently, in a speech by Lord Phillips, the most senior judge in England and Wales, who held: " There is no reason why sharia principles, or any other religious code, should not be the basis for mediation or other forms of alternative dispute resolution. "
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The question of the place of the Shari'a in English law illustrates my twofold strategy. On the one hand, I am advocating that it is necessary to embark on a long-term project to enhance communication and mutual understanding among different groups and individuals in a society. Concretely, this means that it will be necessary to engage in a learning process with regard to Shari'a law in order to be in a position to evaluate what is acceptable and what is not. On the other, I am also arguing for clear rules of the game to settle the confl icts that cannot be solved by appeal to general principles of communication. These rules work as a default position in the case of prolonged and persistent disagreement over some specifi c question. It is clear, for example, that Shari'a principles could not be appealed to in order to justify legislation or judicial decisions.
Conclusion
Religion's place in the European public square is a relatively new issue that deserves more attention. Sajó ' s heartfelt position attempts to deal with many problems from a comparative constitutionalist perspective. This is, indeed, a good point of departure as the problem is common to most of the European states and cannot be reduced to a national issue. Sajó ' s diagnosis, however, can be only partially shared. The responsibility for the open confl ict between religion and the secular state cannot be attributed to one side only, namely (strong) religion. Sajó is, in fact, aware of this and complains in equal measure about the growing claims of religion and the weakness of secular states. His prognosis, however, betrays a more one-sided perspective. The secular state should reassert itself with greater confi dence and respond more aggressively to the threat posed by some forms of religion.
I disagree. I believe that strong religious claims are not an isolated cancer that can be removed from societies by adopting a more aggressive counterposition. The crisis of the secular state is deeper and more daunting than that. It requires a holistic response that blends a more substantive strategy, based on increased communication and mutual understanding, with a thinner strategy that works as a default position and aims merely at coexistence in order to respond to actual cases of confl ict between religion and the secular state. Increased mutual understanding can only take place in the long term; in the meanwhile, it is possible to resort to clear rules of the game in order to cope with discrete problems.
My approach is preferable to Sajó ' s on two levels: the theoretical and the practical. Sajó exposed secularism's practical problems, only to claim that these could be solved by developing a stronger, more self-confi dent, and aggressive theory of constitutional secularism fl owing from the mandates of constitutionalism itself. I claim, instead, that those practical problems -actual confl icts between religion and the secular state -should be taken more seriously in order to modify the attitude with which the secular states respond to diversity and the fact of pluralism. Only then we can offer a better theory regarding the place of religion in the public square. My position blends an idealist theory that promotes mutual understanding and a realist theory that promotes coexistence under conditions of prolonged and persistent disagreement.
